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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effect of CEO risk appetite on the return volatility of a sample of 
large, listed financial firms over the period 2000-2008. After controlling for firm specific 
characteristics, the results give strong evidence that the CEO risk appetite has an 
important effect on firm volatility. The biographical measures for CEO risk appetite are 
significant explanatory variables of all measures of firm volatility employed in this study. 
The effect of CEO age is significant and positive for all four volatility measures, while 
CEO education and current job tenure are negative and significant for all four measures. 
Executive experience with other firm boards has a negative and significant effect on total 
and idiosyncratic volatility. Interestingly, CEO wealth is complementary to the other 
biographical variables with a positive effect all but in the default volatility measure. Our 
results carry implications for shareholders, financial regulators, governments and 
managers. 
JEL Classification: F30; G32; G33. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The subprime mortgage crisis is only the most recent reminder of the primary 
importance of risk management for financial institutions. On the one hand, as Carey and 
Stulz (2005) have emphasized, there cannot be a franchise value without taking on risk. 
On the other hand, Merton (1993) has cautioned that although taking on risk may enable 
a financial firm to make profits, it can also damage its franchise value with customers. In 
its most extreme manifestation, damaged franchise value can cause the demise of the 
financial firm as credit, counterparties and clients dry up and disappear with resulting 
losses for all concerned. The nationalization of Northern Rock and the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007 are recent, vivid examples of 
how excessive managerial risk-taking can damage a financial firm’s franchise value and 
the interests of a wide range of stakeholders, including shareholders, creditors, 
counterparties and clients. Indeed, the sheer level of economic damage and social 
repercussions caused by the crisis has attracted the attention and involvement of 
politicians, governments and regulators. Thus, it is of considerable academic and 
practical interest to understand what factors, if any, affect managerial risk-taking by 
financial institutions.  Indeed, in a survey of emerging themes in the banking sector, 
Wilson et al. (2010) underline the importance of risk-taking incentives and the 
implications for systemic stability. In this paper we look at the factors that could affect 
managerial appetite for risk-taking and examine their effect on the level of firm volatility 
for a set of large, UK financial institutions over the period 2000 to 2008.  
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Although firm performance has often been the focus of studies on managerial 
decision making,1 the relationship between managerial decision making and firm risk has 
also been considered. Many of these studies look at the effect of managerial equity based 
compensation on firm risk in the context of the agency conflict that opposes managers 
and shareholders. In the non-financial sector, for example, Agarwal and Mandelker 
(1987), DeFusco et al. (1990) and Chok and Sun (2007) find a positive relationship 
between firm risk and option-based compensation. In the financial sector, Saunders et al. 
(1990) find that banks with high managerial equity ownership exhibit greater risk than 
those with low managerial equity ownership, while Chen et al. (1998), employing a 
similar methodology over a different time period, find the contrary. However, Chen et al. 
(2006), focusing on option-based compensation, find that both option based 
compensation and option based wealth increase firm risk in the banking industry. Other 
studies look at the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk. Pathan 
(2009), for example, assesses the relationship between firm risk and board structure and 
finds that strong bank boards that reflect shareholder interests positively affect bank firm 
risk while the CEO’s ability to control board decisions negatively affects it. Similarly, 
Akhigbe and Martin (2008) investigate the influence of governance and disclosure on risk 
in the US financial services sector and provide some evidence that stronger disclosure 
and governance reduce firm risk. None of the risk-based studies consider managerial risk 
appetite and the effect it could have on risk-taking.   
                                                 
1
 For studies in the non-financial sector see, for example: Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Lewellen et al. 
(1987), Jensen and Murphy (1990a,b), Agrawal et al. (1991), Mehran (1995),), Goldberg and Idson (1995), 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), and Core et al. (1999). For the financial sector see: Barro and Barro 
(1990), Crawford et al. (1995), Hubbard and Palia (1995), Collins et al. (1995), Houston and James (1995), 
Fields and Fraser (1999), and John et al. (2000). 
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Risk appetite, however, figures prominently in modern financial theory. Risk 
aversion, defined as the extent to which an agent dislikes risk and is willing to avoid it, is 
the most common representation of risk appetite. Markowitz’s (1952) mean-variance 
efficiency analysis and Sharpe (1964) and Lintner’s (1965) Capital Asset Pricing Model 
are derived within the Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) Expected Utility Theory, 
which is based on the assumption of risk aversion. These two models are the pillars of 
modern portfolio theory and the inspiration for hundreds, if not thousands, of academic 
studies.2 Risk appetite is not limited to the concept of risk aversion. Friedman and Savage 
(1948), Swalm (1966), Levy (1969) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979), show that 
typical preferences must include risk seeking as well as risk averse segments. 3  The 
stochastic dominance literature developed by Hadar and Russell (1969) and Hanoch and 
Levy (1969), which includes the concepts of conditional stochastic dominance (Clark and 
Jokung, 1999) and marginal conditional stochastic dominance (Shalit and Yitshaki, 1994) 
extends this insight and provides decision rules for both risk seekers and risk averters. 
Besides risk aversion and risk seeking, risk neutrality also figures as an important 
representation of risk appetite in modern financial theory and practice. Since Cox and 
Ross (1976), many, if not most, asset pricing models are based on the concept of risk 
neutrality. Therefore, given the importance of risk appetite in financial decision-making, 
the issue of risk-taking in the financial sector warrants further inquiry.  
 
                                                 
2
 Expected utility theory has been extended beyond the concept of risk aversion. For example, using the 
same methodology as the Pratt (1964) analysis of risk aversion, Kimball (1990) developed the concept of 
prudence for analyzing problems where the uncertainty affects marginal utility rather than utility. 
3
 There is circumstantial evidence of widespread risk-seeking behavior in the US mortgage sector leading 
up to the crisis, although those that sought the risk are not necessarily those who ended up bearing the risk..     
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  Our study is a first step in this direction. Along with firm specific characteristics 
such as size and leverage, it explicitly considers the CEO risk appetite as a determinant of 
the volatility of financial firms’ returns. The period itself is interesting because it includes 
the dot.com crisis at the beginning of the century, the run-up to the subprime mortgage 
crisis of 2007 and the crisis itself. The case of the UK is also interesting because it differs 
in one significant aspect from that of the US, the object of most research on the 
determinants of firm volatility. Although similar to the US with respect to shareholder 
rights,4 the UK bankruptcy code provides creditors with much stronger legal protection 
than that offered by the US code. On the La Porta et al. (1998) scale, for example, the UK 
is awarded a creditor rights score of 4 (strong creditor rights) whereas the US score is 1, 
making the US one of the most anti-creditor English law countries. Stronger creditor 
rights faced by UK firms have the potential to influence CEO risk-taking. First of all, UK 
creditors have more leeway to restrict managerial decisions that could adversely affect 
the value of their loans. Secondly, CEO jobs are more precarious due to the enhanced 
power of creditors to force liquidation and the absence of a UK equivalent of the US 
Chapter 11, which protects a bankrupt firm from creditors while it restructures and often 
leaves management in place to effect the restructuring. Thus, UK CEOs have more of an 
incentive than US CEOs to rein in their risk taking to protect their jobs5. The strict 
application of the absolute priority rule is also a deterrent to risk-taking. Bebchuk (2002), 
                                                 
4
 For shareholder rights LaPorta et al. report the following scores: Rule of law (RL): UK Score = 8.57, US 
= 10; rating of accounting disclosure standards (ASR): UK Score = 78, US = 71; anti-director rights 
(ADR): UK Score = 5, US = 5. 
5
 Amihud and Lev (1981), Holmstrom and Ricart ICosta (1986) and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) have 
provided evidence that managers avoid taking risks, including those that enhance firm value, due to career 
concerns. According to this view, managers may even spend corporate resources to diversify their 
companies’ operational risks to protect their career.  
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for example, has shown that violations of the absolute priority rule, as witnessed under 
debtor-friendly codes, can lead to greater risk-taking. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is that the empirical results indicate that CEO 
risk appetite does, in fact, play an important role in the determination of the volatility of 
firms in the financial sector. The portion of CEO risk appetite captured by the CEO’s 
demographic characteristics is statistically significant. CEO age has a positive effect on 
firm volatility, while CEO education, job tenure and experience on other boards affect it 
negatively. Finally, CEO wealth is marginally significant, suggesting that an increase in 
wealth leads to more risk-taking.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes 
the data used in the study, provides our expectation about the effect of the variables on 
firm risk, and describes the method adopted for the analysis. Section 3 presents the 
empirical results, section 4 the robustness tests and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data selection 
We hand collected data from Boardex and company annual reports on CEO risk 
appetite starting from a sample of 65 financial firms listed on the FTSE 250 as of January 
20006. CEO risk appetite is captured by wealth and biographical characteristics.  CEO 
wealth includes the value of all stock ownership, unexpired stock options and long term 
incentive plans (LTIPs) accumulated and held by the CEO to date.  CEO biographical 
                                                 
6
 Relevant Boardex data is only available from 2000. 
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characteristics include age, education, time in role, and time on other boards. The data for 
generating firm volatility measures and control variables is obtained from Datastream 
(for full definition see Table 1). After excluding firms without the requisite CEO risk 
appetite information, this yields a sample of 45 financial firms for the period 2000 to 
2008, which includes 24 banks and saving institutions, 10 insurance companies, and 11 
securities firms. 
The dependent variable is firm volatility. We use three measures of firm 
volatility: the standard deviation of stock returns and two measures estimated from a two-
factor model. The annual daily standard deviation of stock returns (TV) is defined as the 
total firm volatility. Following Pathan (2009), Chen et al. (2006) and Anderson and 
Fraser (2000), we employ a two-factor model to decompose total firm volatility into two 
separate market-based volatility measures. 
  
 
 
               jIjmmjjj eIrr +++= ββα            (1)                                     
 
 
 
where rj is the daily return on firm j, rm is the daily return on the market (proxied here by 
the FTSE AllShare index), I is the daily 90-day Treasury bill, and ej is a random error 
term. Estimation of equation (1) produces the following volatility measures for each firm-
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year: βmj, which is a measure of systematic volatility (SYSV), and σej, the standard 
deviation of the residuals, which is a proxy for firm idiosyncratic volatility (IDIOV).  
 
 
2.2 Data description  
One route to estimating measures of risk appetite requires the specification of a 
utility function. 7  Given the wide range of potential functions and the difficulty of 
verifying that any given function is the right one, this looks like a dead end street. An 
alternative to specifying a particular utility function is to use the primitive determinants 
of risk appetite that have been consistently documented in the recent empirical literature: 
wealth, age, education, and experience.8 Hall (1998) argues that risk appetite can be 
proxied by demographic and executive biographical characteristics and many studies 
suggest that this is, in fact, the case. Grimm and Smith (1991) and Gottesman and Morey 
(2006) show a significant relationship between CEO characteristics and organizational 
outcomes. Other studies, such as Hamao et al., (2003) for managerial investment 
decisions, Johnson and Marietta-Westberg, (2003) for disclosure decisions, and Campbell 
et al., (2001) for more focused business strategies, show a relationship between 
managerial characteristics and firm volatility. Chok and Sun (2007) show that age in 
particular is a significant determinant of volatility in the bio-tech sector. In this study, the 
CEO risk appetite variables of interest are wealth (CEO wealth), age (CEO age), 
education (CEO education), and experience (CEO time in other boards and CEO time in 
role). The definition of these variables and their expected effect on firm volatility is 
                                                 
7
 Another route involves developing general market measures of risk aversion. See, for example, Coudert 
and Gex (2008). 
8
 Abdel-Khalik (2007) takes a similar approach in his study of earnings smoothing. 
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discussed below. For convenience, empirical definitions of all variables are presented in 
Table 1. 
 
Our measure of CEO wealth includes all equity-based holdings, including vested 
and non-vested options. Unlike previous studies, our measure for option-based wealth is 
more comprehensive, and consists of the value of all unexpired stock and LTIP (long-
term incentive plans) options accumulated and held by the CEO to date. 9  There is a 
strong argument that equity based wealth (CEO wealth) should have a positive effect on 
firm volatility, because option values are positively related to the stock variance. 10 
According to Hirshleifer and Suh (1992), incorporating stock options into executive 
compensation would predispose CEOs to take riskier decisions than they would 
otherwise. More recently, Coles et al. (2006) also provide evidence of a strong relation 
between executive compensation in the form of options and the financial policies of the 
firm. Similarly, Chen et al. (2006) find a positive relationship between option-based 
executive compensation and firm risk. On the other hand, Smith and Stultz (1985) argue 
that since the value of option-based compensation is sensitive to changes in the 
underlying stock price - as the stock price increases (decreases), value of the options 
increases (decreases) - CEOs holding in or at-the money options in an undiversified 
portfolio would be exposed to firm-specific risk and hence may be inclined to reduce this 
                                                 
9
 The value of the accumulated option is estimated by Boardex using the Black and Scholes (1973) formula 
adjusted for continuously paid dividends. A possible error arises from omitting other assets as well as from 
using Black-Scholes values for stock options. For example, Huddart (1994) and Hall and Murphy (2002) 
highlight the problem with the overstatement of the values of executive stock options to the executive in 
comparison to the value of a comparable traded option. This is due to restrictions on trade as well as to risk 
aversion. 
 
10
 Baranchukand and Chib (2008) provide evidence that firms increase option awards to their CEOs when 
agency problems become more pronounced.  
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risk in order to preserve the stock price. Thus, the foregoing discussion suggests that the 
CEO wealth can affect firm risk either positively or negatively. 
 
Although it is generally agreed that age, education and experience are likely to 
affect firm volatility, there is no definitive argument on the direction it will take. Vroom 
and Pahl (1971) and Hitt and Tyler (1991) document a negative relation between 
executives’ age and risk taking and argue that older CEOs are more cautious and 
conservative and therefore less likely to take risks. Golden and Zajac (2001), however, 
find that strategic change is positively related to age, and argued that it requires a degree 
of confidence and experience to introduce strategic change and that this is mainly present 
in senior and older managers. More recently, Chok and Sun (2007) find that the age of 
managers positively affects idiosyncratic volatility, concluding that only experienced 
leaders dare to take big risks. Where education is concerned, there is some evidence in 
the medical journals of a negative relationship between education and risk aversion (see 
Rosen et al., 2003) attributed to the argument that the educated individual should have a 
more thorough understanding and knowledge of the nature and consequences of a 
specific decision, thereby overcoming a “fear” of risk. The counterargument is that lack 
of education may impair the executive's ability to fully understand the decision at hand, 
and can lead to a risky choice because of an incomplete grasp of the consequences. This 
study uses the number of professional and academic degrees to proxy for education. 
Where CEO experience is concerned, it can be argued that a degree of experience is 
required to recognize the potential benefits of risk taking, such that the more experienced 
CEO may have a greater appetite for risk. The counter-argument is that experience leads 
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the CEO to recognize the pitfalls of risk-taking and reduces his appetite for risk. 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) report that CEO experience is negatively related to risk 
appetite. Similarly, CEO experience has also been positively related to maintaining the 
status quo by Hambrick, Geletkanycz and Fredrickson (1993) and negatively related to 
strategic change by Grimm and Smith (1991) and Thomas and Ramaswamy (1996). 
Thus, the extant literature suggests that we can have no strong priors on the signs of the 
CEO biographical characteristics of age, education and experience. We use two variables 
to proxy for experience, CEO time in role and CEO time on other boards.  
 
 Three control variables are included to capture various manifestations of firm 
heterogeneity in the sample. All empirical studies examine the relationship between firm 
size (Total assets) and firm volatility. There are, however, competing arguments for 
either a positive or negative relation between the two. The negative relationship arises 
from the diversification possibilities related to size. For example, Anderson and Fraser 
(2000) find a negative relation between bank size and total risk while Saunders, Strock 
and Travlos (1990) show a negative relation between systematic risk and bank size. 11  
The positive relationship is related to the ability of larger financial institutions to operate 
with lower capital ratios (Liang and Rhoades, 1991) and pursue riskier activities 
(Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). Size is measured as the log of total assets.  Following 
Chen at al. (2006), we also control for off-balance sheet activity (Non-regular income) 
and expect a positive relationship with firm volatility12. Finally, following Akhigbe and 
Martin’s (2008) study of US financial service sector, we control for the impact of 
                                                 
11
 We thank an anonymous referee for this insight. 
12
 For banks and other financial firms, off-balance sheet activity is measured as non-interest income divided 
by total income; for insurance companies, it is non-premium income over total income. 
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leverage (Leverage) on firm volatility. Normally, higher leverage is associated with 
higher stock price volatility. However, as argued in the introduction, the strong creditor 
rights faced by UK firms have the potential to reduce CEO risk-taking. Thus, the effect 
of leverage on firm volatility can be positive or negative. A negative effect suggests that 
the UK bankruptcy code plays an important role in CEO decision-making. 
  
[Insert table 1]  
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables discussed above. The 
average CEO wealth is £1,552,387 and is significantly lower than the $8,700,130 
reported by Chen et al. (2006) on a sample of US banks. This finding is consistent with 
Conyon and Murphy (2000), who found that US CEOs are granted more options than 
their UK CEO counterparts, indicating that US CEO compensation is tightly linked to 
firm performance. CEOs, on average, are 50 years old, have a university degree, have 
been 4.01 years in the current job, and have a total time experience at board level with 
other companies of 1.85 years. The Pearson’s pair-wise correlation matrix in table 3 
shows that education is correlated with age, time in role and time in other boards.13   
 
2.3 Methodology: 
This section presents the empirical specification of the determinants of firm 
volatility. Let Vit be the computed volatility for the returns of firm i at t, where Vit ∈{TVit, 
SYSVit, IDIOVit}. Let CWTit be the estimated CEO wealth, Xit be the vector of CEO 
                                                 
13
 In variance inflation tests of these variables none was greater than 2, which indicates there is no problem 
with colinearity. 
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biographical characteristics, and Cit the vector of firm specific characteristics (control 
variables). Consider the following specification for: 
 
itiitititit CXCWTV ξλδγα ++′+′+=     (2) 
where α is a scalar, γ and δ are k-dimensional vectors of coefficients, λi are unobserved 
firm fixed effects, and ζit is a disturbance term assumed to be normally and independently 
distributed, with mean zero and variance 2ξσ .
 
 
One salient problem with the estimation of equation (2) is that CWTit (CEO 
wealth) is likely to be endogenous. If this is the case, the results from fixed-effects 
estimation may not be reliable. We address this issue in two ways. First, we use single 
equation instrumental variable (IV) estimation and a Hausman test to investigate whether 
CWTit is affected by endogeneity bias. The previous period CEO wealth (CWTi,t-1) is used 
as an instrument. The economic rationale is that CEO decisions are persistent, and 
business conditions tend to be autocorrelated, leading to autocorrelation in the CEO 
wealth which depends directly on these factors. Given the strong persistence in equity-
based compensation, we expect CWTi,t-1 to be a powerful predictor of CWTit. At the same 
time, the lagged CEO wealth cannot depend on current firm volatility measures and 
hence is uncorrelated with the current period disturbance term (i.e., exogenous). To check 
for under identification (whether instruments are correlated with endogenous variables), 
the Anderson-Canon LM statistic is reported. We also perform the Stock and Yogo 
(2005) weak identification test to control for biased estimators due to weak instruments.  
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In a second step, we model the relation between firm volatility and wealth in a 
simultaneous-equation to capture the potential feedback effect. We estimate this 
relationship in a framework of a system of equations where the equation for firm 
volatility is as specified in equation (2) and the wealth specification follows Chen et al. 
(2006): 
 
itiitititit SPTALogVCWT ελςτη ++++= )(     (3) 
 
where η, τ and ς are scalars. Vit ∈{TVit, SYSVit, IDIOVit} is the computed firm volatility, 
Log (TAit) is the natural logarithm of total assets; SPit stands for the fiscal year-end stock 
price, λi are unobserved firm fixed effects, and εit  is a disturbance term assumed to be 
normally and independently distributed, with mean zero and variance 2εσ . We estimate 
equations (2) and (3) simultaneously using three-stage least squares (3SLS), where the 
disturbance terms are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated.  
 
3. Results 
We first test whether the estimated CEO wealth is endogenous. The Hausman test 
provides significant evidence of an endogeneity bias at the 5% level between all firm 
volatility measures and CEO wealth, suggesting the latter requires instrumentation (see 
Table 4). The Anderson-Canon test is significant and indicates that equation (2) is 
identified. The Cragg-Donald F-statistic is greater than the critical value provided by 
Stock and Yogo (2005), indicating that the null hypothesis of weak instruments can be 
rejected. Hence, based on the argument in the preceding section, we instrument the CEO 
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wealth at t using the t-1-dated CEO wealth together with firm-fixed effects and year 
dummies. The results of the unreported instrument equation show that the coefficient of 
lagged CEO wealth is significant at the 1% level, with a coefficient 0.430, suggesting 
positive wealth persistence, as expected. The R2 and F statistics for the instrumented 
CEO wealth equation are 42% and 1.75 respectively, confirming the quality of these 
instruments.  
  
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Table 4, presents the results of the factors that affect firm volatility using three 
different measures: total volatility, idiosyncratic volatility and systematic volatility. For 
each measure of volatility, we run two models: a model that controls for the unobserved 
firm heterogeneity and a model that controls for the unobserved sector heterogeneity. As 
expected, our measures of CEO biographical risk appetite are key explanatory variables 
of firm volatility. The effect of CEO age is significant and positive for all three measures 
of risk, which suggests that managerial risk appetite increases with age. This finding is 
consistent with Golden and Zajac (2001) and Chok and Sun (2007) and the argument that 
older CEOs are more confident in taking challenging and risky decisions. CEO Education 
is significant for all three measures of risk but affects firm volatility negatively, 
suggesting that educated CEOs tend to adopt a more cautious approach to risk-taking. 
With respect to executive experience, tenure in the current job (CEO time in role) is 
significant and negative for all three measures of volatility, while CEO time in other 
boards also has a negative significant effect on total and idiosyncratic volatilities. This 
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result provides evidence for the argument that experience leads the CEO to recognize the 
pitfalls of risk-taking and reduces his appetite for risk.  
 
The coefficient of the instrumented CEO wealth is not significant for any of the 
specifications and the sign varies. This weak relationship warrants further robustness 
analysis.14  
 
With respect to the control variables, size (total assets) has a positive and 
significant effect on firm volatility. This is consistent with the argument that larger 
financial institutions have the ability to operate with low capital ratios and pursue riskier 
activities. Leverage has a positive and significant impact on firm volatility, which 
confirms the conventional relationship between leverage and volatility. Contrary to 
expectations, non-regular income has a positive and significant effect on the total and 
idiosyncratic volatilities.  
 
Overall, these results suggest that firm volatility is sensitive to the risk appetite of 
the CEO reflected in the demographic variables as well as to the other control variables. 
On the other hand, there is no significant relationship between firm volatility and CEO 
wealth.  
 
                                                 
14
 Preliminary robustness checks suggest that wealth and biographical characteristics are complementary. 
When we run the regressions without wealth, the significance of the biographical variables is diminished. 
This suggests that wealth and the biographical variables are complementary and that both are required for 
the correct model specification. 
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Table 5 shows the results based on the three stage least squares (3SLS). 3SLS is a 
combination of multivariate regression (SUR estimation) and two stage least squares 
(2SLS) that generates instrumental variable estimates, taking into account the covariances 
across equation disturbances (Green, 2003). The results of the 3SLS are generally 
consistent with the results reported in Table 4 with respect to the CEO biographical and 
control variables. The main difference is that Non-regular income is only significant for 
idiosyncratic volatility.  
 
Results are different for the CEO wealth, which is positive but becomes 
significant in most specifications. This is evidence in support of the risk-taking 
hypothesis, implying that the CEO's risk appetite increases as his stock of equity-based 
wealth increases, inciting him to pursue strategies that increase the volatility of the firm.  
 
[Insert table 5] 
4. Further robustness checks 
In this section we conduct further robustness checks to ensure the validity of the 
foregoing results. First, as an additional measure of firm volatility, we calculate a Z-score 
to account for insolvency (distance to default). Following Boyd et al. (1993) and Pathan 
(2009), a Z-score is computed for each fiscal year. The Z-score for each fiscal period is 
computed as Z = {[Average(Returns) + Average(Equity/Total assets)]/ SD(Equity/Total 
Assets)}. Calculated this way, the Z-score has an inverse form, i.e. 1/Z, in order to make 
the interpretation of the signs of coefficients comparable. Thus, a high Z-score means 
more default risk. 
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Results are reported in table 6. The results with respect to CEO characteristics are 
qualitatively similar to those in tables 4 and 5. The CEO accumulated option, however, is 
not significant in any specification. One plausible explanation is that while option values 
are enhanced by increased volatility, these values would be destroyed in the case of 
default. Interestingly, and contrary to the results in tables 4 and 5, we find that firm size is 
negative and significant with respect to insolvency, reflecting perhaps the “too big to fail” 
factor.  
 
Second, we employ the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) system 
estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The GMM estimator 
combines a set of first differenced equations with equations in levels, where instrument 
variables are generated within the system. The consistency of the GMM estimates is 
subject to the absence of higher-order serial correlation in the regression error term and to 
an optimal choice of instruments. The results are reported in Table 7. Tests for serial 
correlation are, denoted as AR(1) and AR(2), are both statistically insignificant, 
suggesting the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation. The Sargan test 
of over-identifying restrictions is not significant, indicating that the instruments used in 
the GMM estimation are not correlated with the error term.  
 
The results of the GMM estimations confirm the results in Tables 4, 5 and 6. The 
interpretation of the coefficients on the proxies for CEO risk appetite (CEO age, CEO 
education, CEO time in role, CEO time in other boards) remains qualitatively the same. 
For example, the statistically significant negative coefficients on CEO education across 
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all the measures of risk suggest that educated CEOs are associated with lower risk. 
Similarly, the statistically significant positive coefficients on CEO age across all 
measures of firm risk except systematic volatility (SYSV) suggest that CEO age relates 
positively to firm volatility. Overall, the GMM estimates in Table 7 provide further 
empirical evidence that CEO risk appetite measures are the key determinants of firm 
volatility. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of CEO risk appetite on firm volatility for a 
sample of large, listed financial firms over the period 2000-2008. We use four measures 
of firm volatility, five proxies for risk appetite, three control variables for firm 
characteristics and three estimation methodologies to test this relation.  
 
The results give strong evidence that the CEO risk appetite has an important 
effect on firm volatility. The biographical measures for CEO risk appetite are significant 
explanatory variables of all measures of firm volatility employed in this study. The effect 
of CEO age is significant and positive while CEO Education, executive experience with 
other firm boards (CEO time in other boards) and CEO tenure in the current job (CEO 
time in role) have a negative and significant effect on total and idiosyncratic risk. These 
results highlight the importance of CEO risk appetite in the determination of firm 
volatility and suggest that age, education and job experience should be considered when 
determining CEO compensation packages. 
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Where shareholders, financial regulators, governments and managers are 
concerned, the implication is that when trying to understand the level of firm volatility 
with a view to regulatory decisions, the pertinent CEO biographical characteristics should 
be considered. We have identified a number of these characteristics but, clearly, this is a 
topic where further research is needed to strengthen and deepen our knowledge. This 
simple but versatile approach provides a basis for generating further hypotheses about 
other variables, which may affect the risk appetite of CEOs, that we have not studied in 
this article, but which might be incorporated in future work.  
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Table 1: Definitions of variables 
Variables 
 
Definition 
 
CEO wealth 
The value of all equity holdings, unexpired stock and LTIPs options 
accumulated and held by the CEO to date (£, thousands).  
CEO age In years 
CEO education # of professional and academic qualifications 
CEO time in role  In years, the length of time that the CEO has been in the current role 
CEO time in other 
boards 
In years, the total length of time spent by the CEO at board level within 
quoted companies other than that being viewed, divided by the number 
of those companies 
Log (Total assets) Total assets of the company  
Non regular income 
The percentage of income derived from non-regular sources (non-
premium income in the case of insurance companies, and non-interest 
income for banks and other financials) 
Leverage  The ratio of long-term total debt to total assets. 
Stock price  Fiscal year-end stock price (pence) 
Total volatility (TV) The annual standard deviation of firm share returns 
Idiosyncratic 
volatility (IDIOV)  Estimated from a two-factor model (see equation 1) 
Systematic volatility 
(SYSV)  Firm market beta (see equation 1) 
Insolvency volatility 
(Z-score) 
Z= 1/{[Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total 
Assets)]/SD(Equity/Total Assets)}.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Min Mean Max SD 
CEO wealth 0 1552.38 24146 2635.3 
CEO age 32 50.07 69 6.62 
CEO education 0 1.43 6 1.15 
CEO time in role 0 4.10 25.2 4.10 
CEO time in other 
boards 0 1.86 14 2.61 
Total assets (£ M) 0.0016 86.5 2390 271 
Non regular 
income 0 37.79 100 41.47 
Leverage 0 0.22 0.96 0.26 
TV 0 0.02 0.09 0.01 
IDIOV 0 0.02 0.09 0.01 
SYSV -0.57 0.70 2.65 0.57 
Z-score 25.66 18.60 12.58 2.97 
 
 
Table 3 Pearson correlation coefficients  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.CEO accumulated option 1 
2. Log (CEO age) -0.1 1 
3. CEO Education 0.22 -0.09 1 
4. CEO time in role 0.04 0.1 0.26 1 
5. CEO time in other boards 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.23 1 
6. Log (total asset) 0.01 -0.01 0.36 -0.04 0.1 1 
7. Total debt ratio -0.03 0.002 0.16 0.09 -0.15 0.27 1 
8. Non-regular income 0.2 0.14 -0.1 -0.05 0.23 -0.44 -0.16 1 
9. TV -0.12 0.05 -0.07 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.02 
10. IDIOV -0.17 0.01 -0.14 0.12 -0.03 -0.15 0.07 0.09 
11. SYSV 0.23 0.06 0.27 0.12 0.28 0.6 0.13 -0.21 
12. Z-score -0.03 0.01 -0.36 0.06 -0.09 -0.99 -0.26 0.43 
Bold texts indicate statistically significant at 1% level or better. 
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Table 4: The determinants of firm volatility 
 TV IDIOV SYSV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO accumulated option 0.03 -0.15 -0.02 -0.17 0.31 0.50 
 (0.36) (-1.42) (-0.23) (-1.18) (0.84) (1.49) 
Log (CEO age) 3.93** 5.34** 3.13** 4.26** 12.48** 12.16** 
 (4.02) (4.09) (3.51) (3.79) (3.20) (2.93) 
CEO Education -0.27** -0.35** -0.20** -0.26** -1.04** -1.01** 
 (-2.78) (-2.72) (-2.19) (-2.30) (-2.65) (-2.43) 
CEO time in role -0.09** -0.09** -0.08** -0.07** -0.22** -0.25** 
 (-3.44) (-2.57) (-3.09) (-2.42) (-1.97) (-2.17) 
CEO time in other boards -0.07** -0.05 -0.08** -0.07* -0.20 -0.08 
 (-2.06) (-1.22) (-2.45) (-1.71) (-0.15) (-0.53) 
Log (total asset) 0.38** 0.20 0.25** 0.11 2.23** 2.75** 
 (2.95) (1.28) (2.15) (0.82) (4.34) (5.61) 
Total debt ratio 3.36** 2.91** 3.47** 3.07** 8.42** 10.78** 
 (4.84) (3.25) (5.47) (3.98) (3.03) (3.78) 
Non-regular income 0.01** -0.001 0.01** -0.001 0.004 -0.01* 
 (2.10) (-1.05) (2.44) (-0.07) (0.41) (-1.68) 
Constant -17.57** -20.35** -13.09** -15.35** -76.03** -83.11** 
 (-4.00) (-3.47) (-3.26) (-3.03) (-4.32) (-4.45) 
Firm-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 268 268 268 268 268 268 
R2 0.59 0.43 0.55 0.41 0.39 0.30 
Hausman-test χ2(1) 31.05** 29.43** 13.68** 15.91** 14.13** 15.04** 
Anderson-Canon LM test 68.02 ** 69.74** 136.19** 71.83** 136.19** 71.83** 
Cragg-Donald F-test 282.09** 281.13** 282.09** 283.04** 282.09** 283.04** 
Note: TV (Total Volatility), IDIOV (Idiosyncratic Volatility) are multiplied by 100, SYSV (Systematic Volatility) 
is multiplied by 10. The estimator is instrumental variables (IV), with an instrumented CEO wealth. Instrument is 
one period lagged CEO accumulated option. The coefficients’ standard errors are adjusted for the effects of non-
independence by clustering on each firm. Hausman test is a test for endogeneity bias. The null hypothesis of the 
Anderson-Canon test is underidentification. The Cragg-Donald F-test tests for weak identification (10% critical 
value of Stock-Yogo weak ID test is 19.93). For full definition of variables see Table 1. t statistics in parentheses 
(* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05). 
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Table 5: Firm volatility determinants - 3SLS 
 
 TV IDIOV SYSV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO accumulated option 0.66** 0.87* 0.49* 0.68 6.74** 7.72** 
 (2.00) (1.74) (1.77) (1.62) (2.76) (2.62) 
Log (CEO age) 5.62** 8.80** 4.47** 7.42** 25.98* 26.42 
 (2.96) (2.86) (2.85) (2.87) (1.95) (1.52) 
CEO Education -0.60** -1.03** -0.46** -0.83** -3.44** -3.54* 
 (-3.05) (-3.09) (-2.82) (-2.98) (-2.46) (-1.88) 
CEO time in role -0.11* -0.17* -0.08* -0.14* -0.72* -0.82 
 (-1.84) (-1.87) (-1.70) (-1.82) (-1.74) (-1.59) 
CEO time in other boards -0.17** -0.21** -0.16** -0.21** -3.59 -0.40 
 (-2.70) (-2.24) (-3.05) (-2.62) (-0.82) (-0.79) 
Log (total asset) 0.81** 0.55* 0.57** 0.40 5.74** 5.70** 
 (3.25) (1.83) (2.80) (1.58) (3.17) (3.28) 
Total debt ratio 5.41** 4.62** 4.65** 4.14** 30.98** 36.00** 
 (3.45) (2.24) (3.59) (2.38) (2.74) (2.97) 
Non-regular income 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.04* -0.06** 
 (0.24) (-1.03) (1.48) (-0.24) (-1.82) (-2.40) 
Constant -28.05** -40.26** -20.88** -32.81** -181.12** -189.08** 
 (-2.76) (-2.52) (-2.49) (-2.44) (-2.46) (-2.04) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 315 315 315 315 315 315 
       
Note TV (Total Volatility), IDIOV (Idiosyncratic Volatility) are multiplied by 100, SYSV (Systematic Volatility) is 
multiplied by 10.. The estimator is three-stage least-squares. For full definition of variables see Table 1. t statistics in 
parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05). 
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Table 6 Determinant of Insolvency Risk (Z-score) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO accumulated option -0.00 -0.07 0.15 0.23 
 (-0.04) (-1.66) (1.58) (1.49) 
Log (CEO age) 1.11** 1.69** 1.38** 2.74** 
 (2.99) (3.19) (2.62) (2.87) 
CEO Education -0.08** -0.12** -0.14** -0.32** 
 (-2.07) (-2.17) (-2.61) (-3.05) 
CEO time in role -0.03** -0.03* -0.02 -0.06* 
 (-2.59) (-1.94) (-1.40) (-1.92) 
CEO time in other boards -0.01 -0.01 -0.04** -0.06** 
 (-1.10) (-0.39) (-2.07) (-2.00) 
Log (total asset) -0.88** -0.96** -0.76** -0.86** 
 (-17.84) (-15.33) (-11.03) (-9.19) 
Total debt ratio 0.65** 0.50 0.92** 0.99 
 (2.44) (1.38) (2.13) (1.52) 
Non-regular income 0.001* -0.001* 0.001 -0.001* 
 (1.78) (-1.74) (0.09) (-1.77) 
Constant -9.56** -10.46** -11.19** -16.28** 
 (-5.69) (-4.37) (-3.95) (-3.29) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes 
N 268 268 315 315 
Note: The dependent variable is Z-score (Distance to default). The estimator in columns (1) and (2) is 
instrumental variables (IV), with an instrumented CEO wealth. Instrument is one period lagged CEO 
accumulated option. The estimator for columns (3) and (4) three-stage least-squares. For full definition of 
variables see Table 1. t statistics in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05). 
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Table 7 GMM results 
 TV IDIOV SYSV Z-score 
CEO accumulated option -0.04 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 
 (-0.77) (-0.27) (0.39) (-0.29) 
Log (CEO age) 2.57** 2.49** 2.31 0.77** 
 (2.79) (2.91) (0.57) (2.14) 
CEO Education -0.40** -0.36** -1.45** -0.11** 
 (-4.39) (-4.27) (-3.62) (-3.23) 
CEO time in role -0.07** -0.08** -0.08 -0.02* 
 (-2.55) (-2.92) (-0.62) (-1.91) 
CEO time in other boards -0.06* -0.07** 0.16 -0.02 
 (-1.84) (-2.23) (1.10) (-1.24) 
Log (total asset) 0.78** 0.56** 3.41** -0.69** 
 (6.48) (4.95) (6.39) (-14.73) 
Total debt ratio 1.56** 1.84** -0.73 0.40 
 (2.21) (2.82) (-0.23) (1.44) 
Non-regular income -0.01* -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (-1.94) (-1.23) (-1.06) (-1.46) 
N 262 262 262 262 
F- test 31.65** 26.49** 11.47** 81.24** 
Sargan test 29.43 18.12 17.04 30.29 
AR(1) 
-1.19 -1.45 -1.84* -1.41 
AR(2) 
-1.37 -1.31 -1.46 -1.60 
TV (Total Volatility), IDIOV (Idiosyncratic Volatility) are multiplied by 100, SYSV (Systematic 
Volatility) is multiplied by 10, Z-score (Distance to default). The models are estimated using Arellano-
Bond system GMM estimator and include year dummies. Second lag period and earlier are used as 
instruments. F-test is a test of the joint significance of reported coefficient estimates under null hypothesis. 
Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions under the null of instrument validity. AR(1) and AR(2) 
are tests for first and second order serial correlation in residuals. For full definition of variables see Table 1. 
t statistics in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05). 
 
 
 
 
